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NO TRIBAL COURT IS AN ISLAND? 
CITATION PRACTICES OF THE TRIBAL JUDICIARY 
 
Rose Carmen Goldberg* 
 
“Modern tribal courts have the unenviable task of doing justice 
in two worlds. They must be familiar with and incorporate 
traditional practices in order to maintain internal credibility with 
the very tribal members that they are appointed to serve, and 
simultaneously appease the non-Indian judicial world.” 
 
- Tribal Court Judge BJ Jones1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Tribal courts’ position at the intersection of two worlds is indeed unenviable. 
And it might be even more complex than tribal court Judge BJ Jones’ statement 
suggests. One of the worlds in which tribal courts do justice, the world of tribal law 
and custom, might not respect tribal boundaries. Instead of restricting their gaze to 
their own jurisprudence, tribal courts might look to other tribes for guidance.2 Tribal 
court judges might cite other tribes’ opinions3 for several reasons. For one, issues 
that arise under tribal law may not be common subjects of adjudication in United 
* J.D. Candidate at Yale Law School (expected 2015). The author is grateful to Professor Eugene 
Fidell at Yale Law School for invaluable guidance and to David Selden at the Native American 
Rights Fund for research support. 
1 B.J. Jones, Tribal Courts: Protectors of the Native Paradigm of Justice, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 87, 
87 (1997).  
2 Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court 
Jurisprudence, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 411, 453 (1992) (“Tribal precedents from other reservations, 
however, may also be relevant.”); according to WestlawNext’s tribal government product sales 
website “[r]ecent decisions now evidence tribal courts citing other tribes when crafting opinions. 
This has created a demand for a systematic, professional compilation of cases from tribal law 
courts.” WESTLAWNEXT, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-
products/practice/government/tribal-government (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).  
3 Throughout this article, this practice is referred to as “intertribal citation.” 
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States courts.4 For instance, tribal membership does not have a full equivalent in 
the United States legal system. 5  Other tribal courts, however, might have 
extensive rulings on such matters. In addition, some tribal courts are young6 and 
do not have many previous decisions of their own to draw upon. With similar 
effect, some tribes might not have the resources to maintain records of prior 
adjudications in accessible formats, or at all.7 To the extent that such tribes want 
to ground their rulings in legal precedent, they must look outward. Looking to other 
tribes’ courts, as opposed to United States courts, might help them maintain 
internal legitimacy insofar as other tribes’ opinions might be more consistent with 
their traditions than United States courts’.8 
Yet there are barriers to intertribal citation that might reduce its incidence. 
Some tribal courts’ opinions may not be available to other tribes because resource 
limitations preclude dissemination.9 Alternatively, some tribes might not want their 
jurisprudence to be publicly available, irrespective of resource requirements. This 
insularity could be motivated by privacy concerns, fear of ridicule, or a tribal 
tradition of non-public mediation. Moreover, citing tribal courts themselves might 
be unable or hesitant to look to other tribes’ opinions, for similar reasons. Other 
tribal courts’ opinions might only be available through databases with subscription 
4 Throughout this article, “U.S. courts” refers to all courts within the U.S. (e.g., the Supreme Court, 
Federal courts, state courts) except for tribal courts. 
5 Tribal membership disputes often turn on blood quantum determinations, for which there is no 
close analogy in U.S. state or national citizenship adjudications. For more information about tribal 
membership and blood quantum criteria, see Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing 
Citizenship Requirements for Indian Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 437 (2002). 
6 See, e.g., Pommersheim, supra note 2, at 454 (“In light of many tribal courts' relative youth, much 
tribal court litigation involves cases in which there is no controlling authority.”); see also Sandra 
Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1997).  
7 See, e.g., Maria Odum, Money Shortage Seen as Hindering Indian Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
1991, at B9 (“legal research on precedents is difficult because, due to lack of money, the volume 
reporting the past three years of judgments in the Indian tribal court system never went to press”); 
Elizabeth E. Joh, Custom, Tribal Court Practice, and Popular Justice, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 117, 
124 (2001) (characterizing tribal courts as “dismally underfunded”); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal 
Courts: Custom and Innovative Law; Indian Law Symposium, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225, 263 n.40 (1994) 
(“The scarcity of resources is a constant barrier.”). 
8 Valencia-Weber, supra note 7, at 254 (“Sometimes customary tribal law will produce results 
different from an Anglo-American court's determination because the substantive law arises from a 
fundamentally different view on the matter at issue. In the use of tribal trust lands and in probate 
distribution of property there is an important difference. The Anglo-American concept of property as 
individualized ownership and exploitation is not germane.”). 
9 Pommersheim, supra note 2, at 450, 456 n.161 (“[P]ractitioners often exhibit a lack of familiarity 
with the precedent of the very court they are practicing before. This problem is often exacerbated 
by irregular publication of opinions in the Indian Law Reporter.”). 
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fees that some tribes find prohibitive. 10 And even if the citing tribal court has 
access, the research and process of applying the other tribe’s opinion to the case 
at hand might be too time-intensive. Additionally, some tribes may have historical 
or current conflicts that make intertribal citation politically unsavory.11 Finally, some 
tribal judges might stand with Justice Scalia in staunch opposition to citation of 
“foreign” courts, 12 and may consider other tribes foreign for citation purposes. 
According to this view, judicial opinions are based on laws that uphold 
particularized cultural norms, and as such, are not applicable beyond the deciding 
court’s jurisdiction.13  
This article examines how tribal courts manage their “unenviable task”14 of 
doing justice in multiple worlds through the lens of citation practices. In so doing, it 
sheds light on the current state of tribal court jurisprudence and provides a 
preliminary empirical basis to guide needed reforms. It also enriches the body of 
scholarship on judicial citations—while much of the literature engages in 
theoretical debate about the functions and effects of citations, this article 
documents and dissects actual practices. By contributing to a fuller picture of how 
citations are used, this article brings this line of inquiry closer to answering the 
underlying question of why. 
The article begins with a background section that consists of three 
subparts. The first provides a brief overview of tribal courts, to situate the article’s 
tribal court citation research findings. The second two subparts survey the existing 
literature on judicial citations generally, and on tribal court judge citation practices 
in particular. Part I begins the article in earnest by detailing the citation review 
methodology and also provides an overview of the availability of tribal court 
opinions. Part II presents the research findings, starting with a summary of results, 
moving to a more detailed analysis of intertribal citations, and concluding with brief 
discussions of the article’s findings on citation of United States and foreign courts.  
10 See, e.g., WestlawNext’s fee-based “Tribal Cases” database at 
http://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/westlawnext/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).  
11 See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Linking Arms Together: Multicultural Constitutionalism in A 
North American Indigenous Vision of Law and Peace, 82 CAL. L. REV. 981, 992 (1994) (discussing 
the “Beaver Wars” fought between the Iroquois and Algonquians in the 1700s).  
12 See, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 541, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
13 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the 
Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (2006).   
14 Jones, supra note 1.  
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Part III concludes the article by discussing the implications of the study’s 
research findings. The findings suggest that tribal courts have responded to their 
unenviable position at the intersection of two worlds by retreating to one—
intertribal citation is exceedingly rare. In conclusion the article argues that these 
low citation rates are likely a function of tribal courts’ limited access to court 
opinions and highlights the importance of removing barriers to access. A short 
addendum recommends several avenues for future research that could contribute 
to concrete improvement in tribal courts’ access to “justice.” 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Tribal Courts 
Today, more than 250 tribes operate their own court systems, 15 
adjudicating on behalf of an estimated one16 to two17 million people. These tribal 
courts18 resemble their United States court counterparts to varying degrees. The 
majority of tribal courts operate in near full conformity with prevailing formal 
adversarial processes.19 Professional and sometimes United States law school 
trained20 judges preside, and adjudication usually results in clear winners and 
losers. 21  In addition, some tribes’ court systems contain hierarchical levels of 
appellate review that more or less mirror the United States court system’s tiered 
model.22 A lesser number of tribal courts still practice traditional forms of dispute 
resolution, such as “Elder Council”23 mediation or “peacemaking.”24 Elder Councils 
15 Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory or Intertribal and Intratribal Common Law, 43 HOUS. L. 
REV. 701, 718 (2006).  
16 O’Connor, supra note 6, at 1.  
17 Odum, supra note 7. 
18 Throughout this article, courts operated by tribes are referred to as “tribal courts.” 
19 Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-
American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 237 
(1997). 
20 Valencia-Weber, supra note 7, at 240. 
21 Valencia-Weber, supra note 7, at 250. 
22 For instance, the Navajo Nation court system is two-tiered, THE NAVAJO NATION JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
http://www.navajocourts.org/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (“The Navajo Nation operates a two-level 
court system: the trial courts and the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, which is the appellate court.”), 
and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation also have a two-tiered system, COLVILLE 
TRIBES TRIBAL COURTS, http://www.colvilletribes.com/tribal_courts.php (last visited Nov. 18 2014) 
(“The Tribal Court consists of a trial court and the Colville Tribal Court of appeals.”). 
23 See, e.g., Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A 
Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 363 n.278 (2000); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking 
Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 66 (2007). 
24 Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 19 (1997). 
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and peacemaking courts are characterized as using community mediators instead 
of judges and basing resolution on unwritten customary law. 25  They are also 
commonly viewed as focusing on restoring harmony to the tribe as a community,26 
as opposed to United States courts’ emphasis on delivering justice in accord with 
individual rights and obligations.27 Mainly because of lack of resources, parties in 
tribal court proceedings are frequently not represented by counsel.28 
Enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 193429 marked the 
birth of the tribal court systems that operate on reservations across the country 
today.30 The IRA empowered tribes to adopt their own constitutions, and many 
tribes adopted constitutional provisions creating tribal courts. 31  These courts 
replaced almost all of the federal government-run “Courts of Indian Offenses” that 
had previously been the principal legal forums for reservations.32 The Courts of 
Indian Offenses, which still serve a limited number of tribes,33 operate according to 
the United States court-style adversarial model. The continued existence of some 
of these courts has been the subject of much criticism.34 
Tribal courts’ jurisdiction is limited. They do not have inherent jurisdiction 
over non-Indians in criminal cases. 35  Rather, this authority requires explicit 
congressional authorization.36 Congress recently provided just such a grant in the 
context of domestic violence. The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 
2013 gives tribal courts the power to convict non-Indians who assault Indian 
25 See, e.g., Joh, supra note 7, at 124-125. 
26 Id. at 123. 
27 Porter, supra note 19, at 251. 
28 Odum, supra note 7. 
29 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2006); Valencia-Weber, supra note 7, at 236.  
30 Pommersheim, supra note 2 at 417. 
31 Zuni, supra note 24, at 20-21.  
32 Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 291 (1998). 
33 BJ Jones, Role of Indian Tribal Courts in the Justice System, INDIAN CHILD TREATMENT TRAUMA 
CENTER (Mar. 2000) at 1, http://www.icctc.org/Tribal%20Courts.pdf.  
34 See, e.g., Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary Analysis, 
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 477 (2002) (“From the beginning, many recognized that “there was, at best, 
a shaky legal foundation for these tribunals. There was no statutory authorization for the 
establishment of such courts....”); Aaron F. Arnold et al., State and Tribal Courts: Strategies for 
Bridging the Divide, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 801, 808 (2011). 
35 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).  
36 Id. at 208 (“Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative 
delegation of such power by Congress.”). 
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partners or spouses or who violate a protection order.37 However, tribal courts are 
still subject to limitations in the criminal sentences and fines they can adjudge. 
Until recently, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) restricted tribal imprisonment 
orders to one year and fines to $5,000 per offense.38 These limits were increased 
by the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010.39    
Tribal courts’ central mandate is to apply tribal law.40 Tribal law includes 
codes,41 constitutions,42 tribal common law,43 and customary law. 44 While tribal 
courts are not directly bound to uphold the United States Constitution, ICRA 
provides parties in tribal court proceedings with protections similar to those in the 
Bill of Rights.45 For instance, ICRA requires tribal courts to provide a jury trial to 
anyone charged with a criminal offense for which incarceration is a possible 
penalty and to consider the accused as having a right to remain silent.46 However, 
federal court review of tribal court decisions is only available after tribal court 




37 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong. § 904 (2013) 
(enacted). 
38 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006). 
39 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, 25 U.S.C. § 2801 (Supp. IV 2010). 
40 Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court Decisions, 46 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 241, 279 (1998). 
41 See, e.g., Yurok Tribal Code, Yurok Tribal Council Ordinance, 
http://www.yuroktribe.org/documents/YurokTribalCouncilOrdinance_v13.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 
2014); Swinomish Tribe Criminal Code, http://www.swinomish-nsn.gov/government/tribal-code/title-
4-criminal-code.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
42 See, e.g., Constitution of the Cherokee Nation, 
http://www.cherokee.org/Portals/0/Documents/2011/4/308011999-2003-CN-CONSTITUTION.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014); Minnesota Chippewa Tribe Constitution 
http://www.llojibwe.org/government/mctDocs/constitution_revised.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
43 See, e.g., Valencia-Weber, supra note 7, at 245. 
44 Fletcher, supra note 23, at 57 (“[T]he importance of customary law in American Indian tribal 
courts cannot be understated.”). 
45 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); 25 U.S.C. §§ 301-1341 (2006); B.J. Jones, Welcoming 
Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court 
Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457 (1998) (“Before the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights 
Act, it was generally recognized that the United States Constitution did not regulate an Indian 
tribe's treatment of its members or non-members.”). 
46 Jones, supra note 45, at 474. 
47 Clarkson, supra note 34, at 481. 
252
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume III, Issue I – Fall 2014  
B. Judicial Citations 
Judicial citation48 has received a healthy dose of scholarly attention,49 but is 
generally not regarded as a top field of study.50 The corpus of writing that does 
exist is at war with itself over the functions and effects of citation. A survey of this 
conflicted body of research suggests three predominant theories of judicial 
citation. The first considers citations as reflecting the legally prescribed basis for a 
judge’s decision. Under this theory, citations are dictated by stare decisis and 
judges have little to no room for creative adjudicative maneuvers.51 The second 
and more cynical theory views citations as “mere masks” 52  for the non-legal 
determinants behind a decision, such as ideology or politics.53 The third, middle-
of-the-road theory characterizes citations as an essential component of a court’s 
legitimacy insofar as they promote judicial constraint. Judges cannot let their 
personal ideology or politics alone decide the case; they must at least find some 
basis for their decision in pre-existing law. According to this last view, citations 
operate as gentle guideposts that keep judges from becoming activists, but they 
are not straightjackets.54 
Assessing the accuracy or normative desirability of these three citation 
theories is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this article takes the less 
traveled road of empirical analysis of citation practices. By painting a concrete 
picture of the current state of judicial citation, empirical research is an important 
step in understanding the functions and effects of citations. Namely, understanding 
how citations are used can be revealing of why they are, or are not, used. So while 
this article does not directly engage in the theoretical debate, it does contribute to 
48 This reference to judicial citation refers to all judges, not just tribal court judges. 
49 See, e.g., William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative 
Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267 (2002) (“there have been numerous empirical studies of appellate court 
citation practices”). 
50 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1932 (2008) 
(“Legal sophisticates these days worry little about the ins and outs of citation.”). 
51 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman ET AL., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 
33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 793 (1981) (“According to our legal theory, judges decide “according to law.” 
They are not free to decide cases as they please. They are expected to invoke appropriate legal 
authority for their decisions.”); Chad Flanders, Toward A Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. 
L. REV. 55, 60 (2009). 
52 Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use and 
Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 493 (2010). 
53 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 50 (“[T]he citation of legal authorities in briefs, arguments, and 
opinions is scarcely more than a decoration.”). 
54 Cross, supra note 52.  
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it. Moreover, statistical documentation of citation practices is lacking.55 The limited 
research that does exist focuses primarily on the citation practices of the United 
States Supreme Court56 and state appellate courts.57 And empirical research on 
tribal court citation is nearly non-existent. The following subsection focuses on the 
one exception.  
C. Tribal Court Citations 
An extensive review of tribal law and citation literature only uncovered one 
study on the citation practices of tribal courts.58 Barsh reviewed a sample of 359 
tribal court opinions published in the Indian Law Reporter59 between 1992 and 
1998. The sample included opinions issued by fifty-six tribal courts at the trial and 
appellate levels. Particular attention was paid to whether judges based their 
decisions on “indigenous jurisprudence”60 as the central aim of the study was to 
determine the extent to which tribal courts rely on “traditional law,” as opposed to 
“Western law.”  
Barsh hypothesized, and the findings ultimately confirmed, that tribes tend 
to lean heavily on their own internal law. Of the 359 opinions in the sample, 284 
(eighty percent) relied to some extent on tribal authority. The majority of these 
internal law opinions relied on tribal court precedent (fifty-six percent), while the 
55 See, e.g., id. at 491 (“[T]he use and practical effect of citations has received little rigorous 
analysis, however.”). 
56 See, e.g., Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971-1999, 75 
IND. L.J. 1009 (2000); William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A 
Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267 (2002); Corey Rayburn Yung, Supreme Court Opinions 
and the Justices Who Cite Them: A Response to Cross, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 41 (2012); John 
Hasko, Making Law with Nonlegal Materials, 46 ADVOC. 22 (2003). 
57 See, e.g., James N.G. Cauthen, Horizontal Federalism in the New Judicial Federalism: A 
Preliminary Look at Citations, 66 ALB. L. REV. 783 (2003); Tina S. Ching, The Next Generation of 
Legal Citations: A Survey of Internet Citations in the Opinions of the Washington Supreme Court 
and Washington Appellate Courts, 1999-2005, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 387 (2007); Paul 
Hellyer, Assessing the Influence of Computer-Assisted Legal Research: A Study of California 
Supreme Court Opinions, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 285 (2005). 
58 Russel Lawrence Barsh, Putting the Tribe in Tribal Courts: Possible? Desirable?, KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y, (1999) at 74 [hereinafter Barsh]. While an earlier article (Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal 
Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285 
(1997)) focuses on tribal court citation practices, its findings do not have an empirical basis; See 
also, Bonnie Shucha, ‘Whatever Tribal Precedent There May Be’: The (UN)availability of Tribal 
Law, 106 LAW. LIBR. J. 199, (2014) (also discusses tribal court citations, but does not have a 
statistical grounding).  
59 The Indian Law Reporter is a print collection of tribal court opinions available for purchase; See 
INDIAN LAW REPORTER, http://www.indianlawreporter.org/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
60 Barsh, supra note 58, at 77. 
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rest referred to tribal legislation. Barsh also found that reliance on internal rulings 
or laws was most prevalent in cases focused on “internal social, cultural or political 
relationships.”61  
In contrast, tribes in the sample tended to look to United States courts for 
guidance on matters of a “jurisdictional or procedural nature.”62 Federal law was a 
more popular citation source (forty-six percent of cases contained at least one 
reference) than state law (only twenty-eight percent). Overall, twenty-six percent of 
cases relied solely on United States law, not citing any tribal authority. Half of 
these cases were procedural or jurisdictional.  
Citation to other tribes’ cases or laws was relatively rare. Ten percent of the 
cases in the sample (36 out of 359) included an intertribal citation. In contrast, 
tribes cited their own jurisprudence or legislation in seventy-nine percent of cases. 
Despite the stark difference between inter- and intra-tribal citation rates, the study 
did not develop its intertribal citation finding. Instead, it focused on a perceived 
need for tribal courts to rely more heavily on traditional law, whether inter- or intra-
tribal.63 
Barsh claims that tribes shy away from relying more strongly on traditional 
law because of a desire to appear legitimate in front of non-tribal audiences. The 
study calls for a reeducation of tribal judges to better acquaint them with traditional 
legal reasoning and for judges to in turn educate their communities about these 
practices.64 While such an initiative may be of value to tribes, the study does not 
provide strong grounding for its underlying assertion that the lack of citation to 
tribal law is motivated by tribal judges’ “fear of non-Indian professionals’ 
opinions.”65 Moreover, Barsh does not entertain other explanations, such as a lack 
of access to opinions or inferior quality of previous rulings.  
This article uses Barsh’s work as a springboard to contribute to a field that 
has received close to no attention. First, this article provides a needed update by 
analyzing contemporary tribal court opinions (issued in 2013); Barsh reviewed 
61 See Barsh, supra note 58, at 79. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 93. 
64 Id. at 89 (“To indigenize their own thinking, tribal judges must be prepared to re-learn legal 
reasoning from a local indigenous perspective; they must risk some of the status they have earned 
in the non-Indian legal profession; and they must embark on the long-term challenge of educating 
litigants and their community as a whole.”). 
65 Id. at 89. 
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opinions issued between 1992 and 1998 and tribal courts have changed in the 
past fifteen years. Indeed, some were not yet in existence when Barsh undertook 
his study.66 Notably, this article will also provide a more nuanced discussion of 
intertribal citation. It will analyze instances of intertribal citation according to cited 
tribe, the nature of the citation, and the type of dispute at bar. As such, it will 
contribute to ongoing debates about the existence of an intertribal “common 
law.”67 
In addition, in an era of increasing reliance on the internet this article’s 
utilization of an internet-based tribal court opinion database, as opposed to 
Barsh’s use of a print compilation, might be more reflective of current or future 
tribal practices. Even if tribal courts do not currently rely heavily on internet-based 
sources of tribal law, they will likely do so more in the future. This article’s review 
of the currently available online tribal court opinion data sources reveals serious 
gaps, particularly in the number of tribes whose opinions are available online. This 
deficiency may hinder tribes from building coherent inter- or intra-tribal bodies of 
law. By bringing attention to this problem, this article hopes to contribute to a 
growing movement for improved availability.68  
II. METHODOLOGY 
A. Data Source 
This article’s analysis of tribal court citation practices is based on a three-
year sample (May 18, 2010 to May 18, 2013)69 of tribal court opinions. The sample 
was extracted from WestlawNext’s online fee-based Native American law 
database.70 While WestlawNext has opinions issued as far back as 1997 for some 
tribes,71 the time-intensiveness of manual review and this study’s limited research 
resources made a more expanded timeframe infeasible. The most recent three-
years were selected so that findings would speak most directly to current 
66 See, e.g., Greg Skinner, Council Establishes Tribal Court, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Sept. 5, 2007), 
http://juneauempire.com/stories/090507/loc_20070905026.shtml. 
67 See, e.g., Valencia-Weber, supra note 7, at 226 (“The focus of this paper is the development of 
American Indian law derived from custom, especially common law, among the indigenous 
nations.”). 
68 See infra note 87 (discussing a partnership the Native American Rights Fund and Westlaw have 
developed to increase the availability of tribal court opinions). 
69 These dates refer to the date each opinion was issued. 
70 While WestlawNext’s Native American law database also includes Federal Indian law case 
opinions issued by U.S. courts, this article’s review was limited to opinions issued by tribal courts. 
71 See infra Table1 (WestlawNext coverage dates for each reporting tribe). 
256
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume III, Issue I – Fall 2014  
practices. Opinions from all court levels were included. This ranged from trial, 
intermediate appellate, to supreme courts. It also included one court whose 
jurisdiction is limited to gaming disputes.72  
Print compilations of tribal court opinions, such as the Indian Law 
Reporter 73  (utilized by Barsh), were ruled out as sources. Online databases 
present numerous advantages, including advanced search (by terms, dates, or 
courts), cataloguing, and opinion extraction tools. Some also include linking 
functionalities that open cited cases at the click of a mouse on the citing opinion. 
WestlawNext’s tools are particularly advanced and were one of the principal bases 
for its selection as this article’s data source. 
WestlawNext was also attractive because of its relative 
comprehensiveness. While it contains opinions for twenty-three tribes, 74 
LexisNexis only has opinions for five. 75  WestlawNext also narrowly beat out 
several lesser-known competitors. For instance, Versuslaw, an online fee-based 
opinion database, contains opinions for one less tribe than WestlawNext (twenty-
two compared to twenty-three).76 Similarly, the Tribal Court Clearinghouse,77 while 
accessible for free online, also only contains opinions for twenty-two tribes. While 
these latter two sources’ tribal court counts do not differ greatly from 
WestlawNext’s, their online functionalities pale in comparison. 
72 Mohegan Gaming Disputes Court, THE MOHEGAN TRIBE, 
http://www.mohegan.nsn.us/Government/gc_main.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
73 The Indian Law Reporter has also been criticized as a source of tribal court jurisprudence on 
non-technological grounds. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 45, at 514 n.78 (“Although there is an 
Indian Law Reporter which compiles tribal court decisions, as well as federal and state law 
decisions involving Indian law issues, the decisions contained therein are voluntarily submitted by 
tribal courts and there is no regulated method of gathering tribal court decisions.”). 
74 Two of these twenty-three are actually tribal court reporters, one is an intertribal court, and a few 
are courts for confederated tribes. Each of these nominal “tribes” includes opinions for more than 
one tribe. (Information about the actual number was not available.) As a result, WestlawNext likely 
contains opinions for more than twenty-three tribes. For ease of expression, these reporters, multi-
tribal courts, and confederacies are grouped with other WestlawNext tribal opinion sources, and 
are included in references to “twenty-three tribes” throughout this article. Such oversimplification is 
not unprecedented. See, e.g., American Tribal Law Reporter Now on Westlaw, Paul L. Boley Law 
Library, LEWIS & CLARK LAW SCHOOL, http://lawlib.lclark.edu/spotlights/TribalLawReporter (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2014) (“The Tribal Law Reporter provides tribal, appeals and supreme court 
opinions from 21 American tribal courts...”). 
75 The tribe count was obtained in an interview with a Lexis representative on May 26, 2013. 
76 Versuslaw.com, http://www.versuslaw.com/help/library/LibCatProfessional.aspx#tribal (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2014).  
77 Tribal Court Clearinghouse, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/decision.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 
2014). 
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Some tribes make their opinions available on their own websites. 78  In 
addition, some tribes participate in joint court systems, sharing judges and 
prosecutors. Some of these multi-tribe systems make their members’ opinions 
available on a single website, such as the Northwest Intertribal Court System’s 
website.79 However, compiling opinions from separate websites would introduce 
the risk of manual error (e.g., failing to include opinions within the sample 
timeframe or miscategorizing opinions). In addition, constructing a multi-tribe 
sample within a single timeframe would be challenging, as these separate sources 
contain opinions issued over different spans of time. In contrast, WestlawNext 
does not require manual compilation or categorization, and the website contains a 
search functionality that selects cases issued within specified timeframes. 
While WestlawNext is the most analytically advanced and comprehensive 
source available, it is not without limitations. Crucially, its supply of tribal court 
opinions is severely limited relative to the number of tribes with tribal courts. 
Currently, there are 566 federally recognized tribes, 80  and according to one 
estimate, 400 unrecognized tribes.81 Roughly half of recognized tribes (283) have 
tribal courts.82 WestlawNext’s database only contains opinions for approximately 
one-tenth83 of these tribes. 
As of four years ago, tribes had added incentive to report their opinions to 
WestlawNext. In 2009, the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) formed a 
“strategic alliance” with West whereby they work together to increase access to 
78 See, e.g., Navajo Nation Supreme Court decisions, 
http://www.navajocourts.org/suctopinions.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2014); Cherokee Nation 
Supreme Court, 
http://www.cherokeecourts.org/SupremeCourt/SupremeCourtCaseOpinionsandInformation.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014).  
79 Northwest Intertribal Court System, http://www.nics.ws/opinions/opinions.htm (last visited Nov. 
18, 2014). 
80 Bureau of Indian Affairs Notice, 78 Fed. Reg. 26384 (May 6, 2013). 
81 GAO, Federal Funding for Non-Federally Recognized Tribes. GAO-12-348. Apr. 2012. 
82 David Selden, Basic Indian Law Research Tips—Tribal Law, National Indian Law Library at the 
Native American Rights Fund, http://www.narf.org/nill/resources/tribal_law_research_2012.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2014).  
83 This percent may actually be a bit higher. As previously mentioned, the twenty-three “tribes” in 
WestlawNext include an intertribal reporter and court, as well as confederated tribes. Each of these 
was only counted once, since accurate figures were not available. This percent should be read as 
an estimate. 
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tribal law.84 Under the alliance, materials submitted to one entity are shared with 
the other. NARF posts materials to its online library;85 WestlawNext includes them 
in its fee-based database.86 Tribes are encouraged to submit materials by being 
offered free access to WestlawNext.87 However, the success of this initiative so far 
appears to be limited. As just discussed, WestlawNext only has opinions for 
twenty-three tribes. Moreover, the number and recentness of opinions for some 
tribes are limited as well. 88  Nevertheless, WestlawNext was the best option 
available. Table 1 provides a summary of the tribal court opinions in WestlawNext. 
 
TABLE 1. Summary of Tribal Opinions on WestlawNext (May 2013) 
84 NILL & Westlaw Work with Tribes to Improve Access to Tribal Law, NATIONAL INDIAN LAW LIBRARY 
BLOG (Aug. 27, 2009, 12:58 PM), http://nilllibrary.blogspot.com/2009/08/nill-westlaw-work-with-
tribes-to.html.  
85 National Indian Law Library, http://nill.softlinkliberty.net/liberty/libraryHome.do (last visited Nov. 
18, 2014). 
86 Westlaw tribal law database directory, 
http://directory.westlaw.com/default.asp?GUID=WDIR00000000000000000000000001872&RS=W
&VR=2.0 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).  
87 NARF Announces New Alliance with Westlaw to Improve Access to Tribal Law, NARF, 
http://narf.convio.net/site/DocServer/westlaw0809.pdf?docID=1521 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).  
88 For instance, there were only nine opinions on WestlawNext for the Fort McDowell Yavapai 
Nation, the most recent of which is seven years old. See Table 1 for the number and recentness of 

























of Oklahoma 120 1997 June, 2012 OK Yes 
2 
Cheyenne River 
Sioux 22 2001 
October, 
2007 SD Yes 
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3 
Confederated 
Salish & Kootenai 




Reservation 126 1997 
December, 





Community 103 1999 
December, 
2005 OR Yes 
6 
Eastern Band of 
Cherokee Indians 117 2000 
August, 
2010 NC Yes 
7 
Fort McDowell 
Yavapai Nation 9 2001 July, 2006 AZ Yes 
8 Fort Peck Tribes 149 1997 
January, 
2008 MT Yes 
9 
Grand Traverse 
Band 96 1997 June, 2009 MI Yes 
10 Ho-Chunk Nation 157 1997 July, 2011 WI Yes 
11 Hopi 115 1997 June, 2012 AZ Yes 
12 
Inter-Tribal Court 
of Appeals of 






Leech Lake Band 
of Ojibwe 26 2002 
February, 
2010 MN Yes 
14 
Little River Band 
of Ottawa Indians 93 1998 May, 2009 MI Yes 
15 Little Traverse 
Bay Bands of 
46 1998 June, 2009 MI Yes 
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Despite being the optimal choice, using WestlawNext data may have 
resulted in a biased sample. Tribes that share their opinions with WestlawNext 
have the resources for publication and distribution.89 As a result, wealthier tribes 
are likely overrepresented. Moreover, tribes that report their opinions do so 
89 The author contacted WestlawNext for more information about its tribal law solicitation and 
publication processes and policies. However, WestlawNext has a policy of not publicly discussing 
its methods of obtaining legal materials. 
Odawa Indians 
16 
Mille Lacs Band 
of Chippewa 
Indians 10 1998 
November, 
2008 MN Yes 
17 Mohegan 203 1997 April, 2013 CT Yes 













Oneida Tribe of 
Indians of 
Wisconsin 755 1997 
September, 
2011 WI Yes 
21 Sac & Fox Nation 18 1998 
March, 
2007 OK Yes 












on Westlaw 4,276 
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voluntarily. This willingness may be associated with practices that are more 
consistent with United States courts’ and less vulnerable to external criticism. Thus 
the sample might contain a disproportionate number of United States-style courts. 
Moreover, WestlawNext does not necessarily contain all opinions issued by 
reporting courts. Since reporting is at the courts’ discretion, tribes may only report 
a portion of their caseload.90 And tribes’ bases for selection may bring in other 
dimensions of bias. 
In addition, several tribes may be overrepresented in WestlawNext. Nearly 
one-quarter (1,017 out of 4,276)91 of all opinions in WestlawNext’s tribal database 
are from a single reporter, namely, the Oklahoma Tribal Courts Reports. While 
precise information about which courts’ opinions are in this reporter was not 
available, it is unlikely that the number of opinions actually issued by these courts 
accounts for one-quarter of all opinions issued by tribal courts.92 The Oneida Tribe 
of Wisconsin reported the second greatest number of opinions, accounting for 
nearly one-fifth (755 out of 4,276) of the tribal opinions in WestlawNext. To put this 
in context, the Oneida Tribal Courts had jurisdiction over 16,567 members in 
2010,93 whereas Navajo courts adjudicated on behalf of roughly 332,129 people 
that year. 94 , 95  Only six percent, compared to Oneida’s eighteen percent, of 
WestlawNext’s tribal opinions were issued by the Navajo Nation. 
90 Barsh, supra note 58, at 80 (“It must be borne carefully in mind that the sample consists of 
published decisions, rather than total caseload. It could be argued that unpublished decisions 
involve more “traditional,” or at least more informal, approaches to dispute settlement.”). 
91 These figures may contain a limited number of double counted opinions. While several duplicate 
opinions were identified and removed from the article’s three-year sample (see this paper’s 
Methodology section for more detail about this process), conducting the same data cleaning 
procedure for WestlawNext’s entire tribal court opinion database was beyond this study’s scope.  
92 The study author was unable to obtain reliable information about the precise number of tribes 
and/or tribal courts covered by the Oklahoma Tribal Courts Reports. A rough estimate suggests 
that approximately twenty tribal courts are included. See Oklahoma Legal Services Inc., Seeking 
Native Justice, http://thorpe.ou.edu/OILS/court.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). While these 
reports also contain opinions issued by Courts of Indian Offenses (administered by the U.S. 
government), the study’s three-year sample did not contain any and WestlawNext’s overall tribal 
court database did not appear to either. 
93 Oneida Nation of Wisconsin, Tribal Statistics, 
http://witribes.wi.gov/docview.asp?docid=5637&locid=57 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
94 United States Census Bureau, The American Indian and Alaska Native Population: 2010. In 
discussing tribal population size, this article alternates between Census data, based on “tribal 
groupings,” and membership counts publicized by tribes themselves. While these figures are not 
strictly comparable, population size data was not available for all tribes based on a single metric.  
95 Admittedly, tribe size is not necessarily proportionate to tribal court caseload. (For instance, 
some tribes might be more litigious than others, some might resort frequently to extra-judicial 
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WestlawNext also suffers from underrepresentation. The largest tribal 
affiliation according to the most recent United States Census is the Cherokee 
Nation, and their opinions only account for a fraction of WestlawNext’s inventory.96 
The two Cherokee Nation courts in WestlawNext (the Cherokee Nation of 
Oklahoma and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians) together only account for 
five percent of the total opinions. Several other tribes ranked as among the largest 
were completely missing from WestlawNext. For instance, the Choctaw is the third 
most numerous tribe97 but did not have any opinions.98 Several more of the top ten 
most numerous tribes, including the Chippewa, Sioux, Apache, Blackfeet, and 
Creek also were not represented in WestlawNext’s database.99 
B. Study Sample 
The three-year sample extracted from WestlawNext totaled 231 opinions. 
An opinion title and number comparison revealed that twenty-three were included 
in duplicate.100 These duplicates were dropped. This resulted in the removal of 
one-tenth of the initial sample, leaving a final sample of 208 opinions. These 
opinions were issued by seventeen tribal courts. See Table 2 on the next page for 
a summary of the final sample. 
Two tribal courts together accounted for almost half of the sample. The 
Navajo Supreme Court had the most, accounting for nearly one quarter. The two 
Mashantucket Pequot courts (trial plus appellate) were a close second, with 
twenty-one percent of the sample’s opinions. Barsh’s sample was also dominated 
by these two tribes’ courts. Barsh noted that the numerosity of Navajo opinions 
makes sense, in light of that tribe’s size. 101  However, Barsh viewed the high 
mediation, and some might lean heavily on U.S. courts.) This study uses tribe size as a rough 
estimate of expected opinion issuance figures, since tribal court caseload data is not available.  
96 Census, supra note 94 (“The Cherokee tribal grouping had the largest alone-or-in-any-
combination population, with 819,000.”). 
97 Id. 
98 However, Choctaw rulings were the subject of two of the intertribal citations identified within the 
study’s three-year WestlawNext sample. See Table 6 for more information. 
99 Census, supra note 94. It should be noted that while some of these tribes are included in the 
Oklahoma Tribal Courts Reports, none of their opinions were in WestlawNext. 
100 Discussions with WestlawNext representatives (on May 23, 2013) revealed that WestlawNext 
was not aware that it was publishing some tribal opinions more than once. The study author’s 
inquiry initiated an investigation that revealed a pattern of double postings within WestlawNext’s 
tribal court database. WestlawNext was of the opinion that the double postings were not the result 
of duplicate submissions by tribes. Rather, the duplication was due to WestlawNext error. 
WestlawNext subsequently notified the study author that the errors had been corrected. 
101 Barsh, supra note 58, at 77-78 (“It should not be surprising that Navajo is heavily represented 
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number of Pequot opinions as misrepresentative because many were casino-
related, and excluded Pequot opinions for this reason. 102  Presumably, this 
decision was motivated by the study’s focus on traditional law and an assumption 
that gaming is beyond this scope. This article aims to shed light on citation 
practices more generally, and thus did not follow Barsh in disregarding Pequot 
opinions.103 
TABLE 2. 3-Year Sample Tribal Opinions (May 18, 2010- 2013) 
 Tribal Court Name Number of 
Opinions 
Level in Tribal Court 
System 
1 Appellate Court of the Hopi 
Tribe 
13 Appellate Court 
2 Cherokee Court Eastern 
Band of Cherokee Indians 
1 Trial Court 
3 Cherokee Nation Supreme 
Court 
9 Supreme Court 
4 Colville Tribal Court of 
Appeals 
18 Appellate Court 
5 Coquille Indian Tribal Court 1 Trial and Appellate Court 
6 Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme 
Court 
2 Supreme Court 
7 Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court 18 Trial Court 
8 Mashantucket Pequot Court 
of Appeals 
6 Appellate Court 
																																																																																																																																																																								
since it has the largest population and caseload.”).  
102 Id. at 78 (“The Pequot court is clearly overrepresented in relation to the size of that tribe, 
however—an artifact of the high volume of disputes involving the Pequots' casino, which accounted 
for 12 percent of all the reported cases. For this reason, the Pequot decisions have been deleted 
from some of the analyses presented below.”). 
103 Barsh reported two sets of findings, each based on a different sample. One sample included 
and the other excluded Pequot opinions. Since this study included Pequot opinions, the Barsh 
findings it discusses are based on the Pequot-inclusive sample. 
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9 Mashantucket Pequot Tribal 
Court 
37 Trial Court  
10 Mohegan Gaming Disputes 
Court of Appeals 
2 Appellate Court 
11 Mohegan Gaming Disputes 
Trial Court 
16 Trial Court 
12 Mohegan Tribal Trial Court 5 Trial Court 
13 Oneida Tribal Judicial 
System Trial Court 
17 Trial Court 
14 Shoshone and Arapaho 
Tribal Court 
1 Trial and Appellate Court 
15 Supreme Court Eastern Band 
Cherokee Indians 
2 Supreme Court 
16 Supreme Court Navajo 
Nation 
46 Supreme Court 
17 Tulalip Tribal Court of 
Appeals 
14 Appellate Court  




In contrast, several courts in the sample only had one or two opinions. For 
instance, the Coquille Tribe and Shoshone-Arapaho Tribes’ joint court each only 
had one opinion. As one might expect based on this small turnout, all three of 
these tribes are small. Coquille’s membership is estimated at 695 people,104 in 
stark contrast to the Navajo Nation’s 332,129.105 The Shoshone and Arapaho 
																																																								
104 Coquille Tribe, NORTHWEST PORTLAND AREA INDIAN HEALTH BOARD, 
http://www.npaihb.org/member_tribes/tribe/coquille_tribe/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
105 Census, supra note 94. 
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Tribes are larger than Coquille, at 7,400 and 4,200 respectively,106 but still small 
compared to some of the other tribes in the sample. As such, these three tribes’ 
limited representation in the sample may actually be proportionate to their real-
world judicial presence. However, the small number of opinions limited the 
inferences that could be made. Clearly, one opinion (or even quite a few more) for 
a single tribe or court is not revealing of an overall citation “practice.”  
The courts with opinions in the sample were well-balanced numerically in 
terms of court level. Of the sample’s issuing courts, six were at the trial level, five 
were appellate (excluding supreme courts), and four were supreme. (Two of the 
courts, not included in the foregoing, operate on both the trial and appellate 
levels.) However, this numerical balance is surprising since not all tribes have 
appellate courts and not all cases are appealed. Thus, one would expect a greater 
proportion of trial-level courts, as well as opinions. Forty-five percent of the 
sample’s opinions were issued by trial courts, whereas reason suggests that trial 
opinions should account for the vast majority.  
One possible explanation is that appellate courts are more able or eager to 
report their opinions, perhaps because of greater access to resources or more 
confidence and willingness to expose their adjudication. Alternatively, cases that 
reach appellate levels may be high-profile or particularly far-reaching, and tribal 
communities may demand decisional details. Regardless, this study’s findings 
might be more reflective of appellate than overall citation practices, which likely 
have a wider basis in trial court adjudication.  
C. Data Analysis 
Each of the 208 opinions in the sample was reviewed using a standardized 
review instrument. The instrument was developed based on the results of a review 
of a sub-sample (totaling thirteen opinions), consisting of the tribal court opinions 
issued within the last six months available on WestlawNext. This preliminary 
review suggested ten citation categories to guide citation tracking: (1) cite to same 
court (self-referential); (2) cite to lower court (same tribe); (3) cite to higher court 
(same tribe; excluding tribal supreme court opinions); (4) cite to supreme court 
(same tribe); (5) cite to other tribal court; (6) cite to state court in tribe’s primary 
106 Frequently Asked Questions, THE ARAPAHO PROJECT, 
http://www.colorado.edu/csilw/arapahoproject/contemporary/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
266
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume III, Issue I – Fall 2014  
state; (7) cite to other state court; (8) cite to Circuit court; (9) cite to United States 
Supreme Court; and (10) cite to foreign court.  
While the preliminary sub-sample review also revealed citations to legal 
materials other than opinions (for instance, Black’s Law Dictionary 107  made 
several appearances) as well as a variety of non-legal sources (ranging from 
Goethe 108 to Forrest Gump 109), only citations to court opinions were routinely 
tracked. 
For each opinion, citations were identified and logged according to the ten 
categorizes. These findings were recorded in a master database. This analysis did 
not account for the nature of the citation. For instance, negative treatment was not 
differentiated from positive. Such nuanced assessment was prohibitively time-
intensive, and raw citation counts are quite meaningful in their own right. Even if a 
case is cited as not dispositive, such reference still functions as an 
acknowledgement that the cited court’s rulings are potentially relevant. Moreover, 
references to other courts’ opinions are revealing of courts’ access to external law, 
regardless of the level of deference shown. 
Citations in opinion footnotes, in addition to those in the body of the opinion, 
were recorded. The analysis did not differentiate citations based on their location. 
In addition, when a citation itself explicitly referred to another opinion,110 each cited 
opinion was recorded separately. However, cited opinions were only counted once 
per citing case, not each time they appeared if they were referenced multiple 
times. While analyzing the number of times individual cases are cited in a given 
opinion might speak to the weight given to the cited material, assessing depth of 
treatment was beyond this study’s scope. Finally, cited opinions were not 
107 See, e.g., K.F. v. Quil Ceda Village Liquor Store, 2013 WL 1812229 (Tulalip C.A.), 5 (“Black's 
Law Dictionary, Centennial Edition (1991), defines “pro se” as “For one's own behalf.”). 
108 Walton v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., MPTC CV-AA-2011-174, 2012 WL 4513385 
(Mash. Pequot Tribal Ct. Oct. 1, 2012) (“Thus, unlike Goethe's Dr. Faust...who made [his] own 
deals with the devil and got at least temporary benefits, here the plaintiff received very little (only a 
few sips of beer) in return.”). 
109 EXC, Inc. v. Kayenta Dist. Court, SC-CV-07-10, 2010 WL 3701050 (Sept. 15, 2010) (“The 
buttes are featured in ...recent movies such as Forrest Gump...”). 
110 E.g., Sandoval v. Navajo Election Admin., SC-CV-62-12, 2013 WL 775403 (Feb. 26, 2013); In 
re Appeal of Vern R. Lee, 6 Am. Tribal Law 788, 789–90 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2006) (citing Begay 
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examined to determine if the cited text itself contained another citation. While this 
was likely the case in a few instances, this study was only concerned with tribal 
courts’ explicit reliance on other opinions. 
III. FINDINGS 
A. Results Overview 
According to a detailed review of the three-year sample, tribal courts look 
predominantly to tribal law in their citations. Seventy percent of all citations to 
other opinions (1,197 out of a total 1,706 citations in the sample) were to tribal 
court decisions. In comparison, tribal courts only turned to United States court 
jurisprudence for thirty percent of their citations (508 out of the total 1,706 
citations). Strikingly, tribal courts barely acknowledged foreign courts’ existence, 
with a mere one citation in the entire sample. See Table 3 below for a summary of 
these findings. 
 











































1,706 8 1,197 6 508 2 1 
 
On average, opinions in the sample cited eight cases. This rate does not 
differ greatly from rates reported for some United States courts. For instance, one 
study found that the United States Supreme Court cites an average of seven Court 
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decisions in each opinion, and cites elsewhere infrequently. 111  State supreme 
courts, however, appear to cite more heavily. According to one study, state 
supreme court opinions include an average of fourteen citations.112 Similarly, a 
study of the New York Court of Appeals (the state’s highest court) found an 
average of eleven citations per opinion.113 Relative to these United States courts, 
tribal courts appear to be on the lower end of the citation spectrum.  
However, there are many United States courts that may be more 
comparable to tribal courts for which citations rates were not available. These 
similarities, such as lack of legal resources, judges’ with limited training, and 
geographic remoteness, could affect citation rates. And if rates for these United 
States courts are indeed low, the overall rate for United States courts may actually 
be closer to tribal courts’ than the studies suggest.  
B. Citations to Tribal Courts 
The vast majority of citations to tribal precedent was self-referential.114 Just 
over eighty percent of all citations to tribal opinions (967 out of a total of 1,197 
citations to tribal courts) were to opinions previously issued by the citing court 
itself. In some instances this insularity is likely largely due to the fact that some 
tribal court systems only consist of one court, which functions on both the trial and 
appellate levels. Two tribal courts included in the sample, the Coquille Indian 
Tribal Court and the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribal Court, each play this dual role. 
These courts cannot cite tribal court opinions other than their own without looking 
outside their own tribes.  
These two courts each only accounted for one opinion out of the sample’s 
208. So the fact that some tribal court systems are single-tiered likely does not 
fully account for the finding that tribal courts cite their own decisions so much more 
frequently than they cite other courts in their tribe’s judicial system. Alternatively, 
tribal courts’ insularity could be an indication that even access to opinions issued 
111 Cross, supra note 52, at 530. 
112 Lawrence M. Friedman ET AL., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. 
L. REV. 773, 795 (1981).  
113 New York Appellate Decisions Show Preference for Recent Cases, Commentaries and Bill 
Memos, N.Y. St. B.J., May 2002, at 8. 
114 A “self-referential” citation is when the citing tribal court refers to one of its own opinions. 
269
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume III, Issue I – Fall 2014  
within the same tribal court system, but at different levels, is limited. See Table 4 
below for a summary of the findings on citations to tribal courts.115 
 
TABLE 4. Citations to Tribal Courts: Findings Summary 
 
 
While the foregoing suggests that tribal courts are strongly focused on their 
own jurisprudence, they are not blind to the other courts that adjudicate on behalf 
of their tribes. Almost one-tenth of citations to tribal courts (103 of the 1,197 total) 
were to higher courts within the same tribal court system. Courts looked to their 
tribe’s supreme court to a lesser extent, only citing supreme courts in five percent 
of their citations to tribal courts. However, this finding should be read in light of the 
fact that a number of tribes do not have supreme courts. Thus this low citation rate 
may largely be the result of necessity and not choice. Citation to lower courts 
within the same tribe was only slightly less frequent than citation to supreme 
courts, accounting for just under five percent.  
In contrast, the number of citations to other tribes’ courts was strikingly 
small. A mere one percent of citations to tribal courts (10 out of 1,197) were 
intertribal. These ten intertribal citations appeared in six opinions. (See Table 5 on 
the following page for a detailed description of each of the ten instances of 
115 The categories in Table 4 are mutually exclusive. For instance, even though a citation to a tribal 
supreme court may technically be a citation to a higher court, citations to mere appellate courts 
were disaggregated from courts identified as “supreme.” Similarly, if a tribal supreme court cited 
itself, this citation only counted towards the “self-referential” citation tally. 
116 As noted in this article’s Introduction, the practice of citing to other tribes is generally referred to 






























1,197 967 55 103 62 10 
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intertribal citation.) This low rate of intertribal citation may be the result of a lack of 
access to other tribal courts’ decisions. 117  It could also be due to inter-tribal 
animosity, or a general distaste for citing “external” tribal jurisprudence because of 
perceived differences in tribal custom. 
Barsh’s findings on intertribal citation are not directly comparable to this 
article’s, but not for the reason discussed previously (i.e., a difference in the unit of 
analysis, namely, percentage of opinions versus citations). The Barsh study 
included citations of tribal legislation within its intertribal citation category, and this 
study only recorded citations to other tribes’ decisions. Barsh found that ten 
percent of opinions included at least one citation to another tribe’s law or legal 
decision. In contrast, this study found that only three percent of opinions (6 out of 
208) included at least one intertribal citation. That Barsh found a greater 
prevalence of intertribal citation than this study is not unexpected since Barsh’s 
definition of intertribal citation was broader. 
 
TABLE 5. Citations to Tribal Courts: Detailed Findings  
117 Aaron F. Arnold ET AL., State and Tribal Courts: Bridging the Divide, CENTER FOR COURT 
INNOVATION (2011) at 12 ([T]ribal courts often lack the technological capacity to store and retrieve 
information from court cases, and they do not have reliable access to compilations of tribal court 
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118 Northwest Intertribal Court System, http://www.nics.ws/opinions/opinions.htm (last visited Nov. 
18, 2014). 
119 VersusLaw, http://www.versuslaw.com/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
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121 VersusLaw, supra note 119. 
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One tribal court, the Tulalip Tribal Court of Appeals of Washington State, 
was responsible for half of the instances of intertribal citation. This finding is not 
surprising in light of the fact that the Tulalip Tribal Court of Appeals is administered 
by the Northwest Intertribal Court System (NICS).122 NICS is a “consortium of 
Indian tribes” that provides legal services to its tribal members. 123  The NICS 
judges who sit on the Tulalip Tribal Court of Appeals bench and write the court’s 
opinions also adjudicate for other tribes. Some of these judges are members of 
other tribes.124  
Moreover, all of the Tulalip Appeals Court’s intertribal citations were to 
decisions issued by other NICS member tribes—the Hoopa, Puyallup, and 
Squaxin Island tribes are all members.125 It is also notable that all of the Tulalip’s 
122 Tulalip Appellate Justices, TULALIP TRIBAL COURT, http://www.tulaliptribes-
nsn.gov/Home/Government/Departments/TribalCourt/AppellateJudgeBio.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 
2014).  
123 About NICS, NORTHWESTERN INTERTRIBAL COURT SYSTEM, http://www.nics.ws/ (last visited Nov. 
18, 2014). 
124 Tulalip Appellate Justices, supra note 122.  
125 Tribal Court Contacts, NORTHWESTERN INTERTRIBAL COURT SYSTEM, 
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intertribal citations involved positive treatment. The other courts’ decisions were 
referred to as applicable authority, and not for the sake of distinguishing. 
Moreover, three of these five citations were in reference to the existence and 
persuasiveness of an intertribal common law. Taken together, these facts suggest 
that the Tulalip court’s propensity for intertribal citation is a function of the 
intertribal nature of the Tulalip court itself.  
 Two other tribes were each responsible for two instances of intertribal 
citation. One of these courts, the Colville Tribal Court of Appeals, cited the Navajo 
Supreme Court on both occasions. Interestingly, the Colville court’s treatment of 
Navajo jurisprudence was contradictory. In one instance, the Colville court only 
noted the Navajo case because it was cited in a party’s submissions, and explicitly 
stated that it does not find Navajo law persuasive.126 (However, the citing court did 
take the Navajo decision seriously enough to bother distinguishing it.) In the other 
instance, the Colville court cited a Navajo decision positively, albeit indirectly, to 
establish a court’s duties.127 The citation supported an assertion that all courts 
have “inherent powers” of review. It was indirect insofar as the citation referred to 
an opinion issued by the citing court itself that cited the other tribe (Navajo). 
This apparent inconsistent treatment could be the result of the small sample 
size (a review of a larger number of decisions may actually reveal a more 
consistent trend) or perhaps no fixed view on the persuasiveness of other tribal 
courts’ decisions. The fact that the negative instance of intertribal citation was in a 
family law matter (conceivably related to tribe-specific custom) and the positive 
treatment appeared in an enrollment/judicial misconduct case (more procedural in 
nature, and perhaps more generalizable across tribes) invites speculation about 
whether the nature of the case affects a court’s willingness to apply other tribes’ 
decisions. However, the significance of such an inference is negated by the small 
sample size. 
The second tribal court that was responsible for two instances of intertribal 
citation, the Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court, also cited the same court on both 
occasions. However, these two citations (to the Choctaw Tribal Court) were more 
procedural and neutral than the instances of intertribal citation just discussed. Both 
citations referred to the Choctaw court rulings for factual purposes, to establish the 
126 Zavala v. Milstead, AP09-008, 2011 WL 5172905 (Sept. 12, 2011) (“Even if we were persuaded 
to follow Navajo case law, which we aren't at this time, Miles is not apposite to the holdings 
herein.”). 
127 Desautel v. Dupris, AP10-012, 2011 WL 7867369 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
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outcome of previous adjudication.128 Thus these two instances of intertribal citation 
did not reveal a strong disposition one way or the other towards other tribal courts’ 
jurisprudence. 
 The remaining instance of intertribal citation, by the Coquille Indian Tribal 
Court, was notable for its demonstration of broad receptivity to other tribal courts’ 
jurisprudence. It introduced the other courts’ opinion by stating that “[a]t least one 
tribal court is in accord.” 129 This statement could be read to suggest that the 
Coquille court generally considers other tribal courts’ jurisprudence as persuasive, 
and may not distinguish the degree of authority according to the precise identity of 
the other court. 
C. Citations to United States Courts 
In citing United States courts, tribes frequently turned to state courts. Half of 
the citations to United States courts were to state courts (247 out of the 508 
citations to United States courts). The Barsh study also found what it characterized 
as a high level of citation to state courts, reporting that nearly thirty percent of 
opinions in its sample relied to some extent on state law. Barsh found this 
dependence disturbing in light of tribal courts’ need to distinguish themselves from 
state courts to legitimize their separate existence.130 To the extent that tribal courts 
compete with state courts, they are most directly in competition with those in their 
own states. As a result, tribal courts’ rates of citation to their own states might 
speak most directly to their chances of survival as independent entities. In 
particular, high rates of citation to their own states could be a harbinger of 
reduction, or even demise, of tribal court jurisdiction. 
This strong tendency could be the result of a number of conditions. Tribal 
court judges might be particularly well-versed in the laws of their own states. In 
addition, tribes might have better access to decisions issued by courts in their 
states than to the opinions of other United States courts. This superior access 
could be the result of geographic proximity or state-tribal court partnerships.131 
128 Billie v. Collins, CV 10-51, 2010 WL 4076348 (Sept. 13, 2010). 
129 Nissen v. Coquille Econ. Dev. Corp., C10-03, 2010 WL 4939527 (Dec. 3, 2010). 
130 Barsh, supra note 58, at 80 (“The frequency with which tribal courts rely on state law is 
troublesome, however, in the context of tribal courts' historical efforts to distinguish themselves 
from state courts, and justify their continued existence as separate judicial institutions.”). 
131 Arnold, supra note 117. (“Just as important as the written agreements and new court 
procedures, tribal-state court forums have helped to open new lines of communication and 
improved relationships between tribal and state court judges, administrators, and practitioners.”). 
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Tribal courts’ overwhelming reliance on their own states could also be due to the 
fact that tribal and state courts have overlapping jurisdiction over a range of 
matters, from family law to criminal law.132 As a result, the legal questions that 
arise in their adjudications, as well as the specific disputes themselves, may be 
the same. See Table 6 below for a summary of the findings on citations to United 
States courts. 
 
TABLE 6. Citations to United States Courts: Findings Summary 
 
 
Tribal courts devoted the other half of their United States citations to federal 
circuit courts and the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was 
almost twice as popular as all circuit courts combined. While thirty-three percent of 
United States court citations were to Supreme Court decisions, only twenty 
percent were to circuit courts. This disparity may be due in some part to a greater 
number of tribes’ viewing Supreme Court precedent as relevant, whereas circuit 
courts may only be considered persuasive by tribes in their jurisdictions. Tribal 
court judges may also be more aware of Supreme Court decisions because of 
greater publicity or emphasis in legal training.  
 
132 Id. at 2 (“[T]hese courts share overlapping legal jurisdiction—including shared authority to 
adjudicate matters and issue binding orders—in areas like domestic relations, criminal prosecution, 
and contracts.”). 
133 A tribe was generally considered to be associated with state(s) where their central government 






Number of  
Citations to 
Courts in Citing 
Tribe's 
State(s)133 
Number of  
Citations to 
Courts in 
 Other States 
Number of  
Citations to  
Federal Circuit 
Courts 






508 194 53 98 163 
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D. Citations to Foreign Courts  
The three-year sample only included one citation to a foreign court. 134 
Moreover, the foreign court is not in a distant land. It was neighboring Canada. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the citing court was the Navajo Supreme Court, which did 
not frequently cite beyond its own chambers. Indeed, almost all of the Navajo 
Supreme Court’s citations (eighty-four percent)135 were to opinions it issued itself. 
Even its one foreign court citation was somewhat self-referential. Its reference to 
the Canadian court was based on a lower Navajo court opinion136 that discussed 
the Canadian opinion “at length.”137  
However, the Navajo Supreme Court opinion itself includes a detailed 
discussion of Canadian law and its relevance to the tribal customs involved in the 
child custody dispute at bar. The Navajo Supreme Court even faults the lower 
Navajo court for not sufficiently considering Canadian law. Its basis for this 
chastisement is that Canadian law should be used as a lodestar because its 
underlying principles mirror Navajo custom.138 Specifically, the Navajo Supreme 
Court looked to Canada to establish that “tribal judges will look to the welfare of 
the child before the rights of a natural parent.’”139  
That the one citation to a foreign court involved a matter of custom may 
initially seem counterintuitive. Arguably, custom is unique to each society. 
According to this view, foreign nations’ cultural beliefs may be too alien to be relied 
upon. However, tribal courts might actually be particularly willing to cite further 
afield on customary matters because of a lack of legal precedent closer to home. 
In addition, decisions based on custom may be harder to explain because of weak 
134 In re A.M.K., SC-CV-38-10, 194, 201, 2010 WL 4159270 (“See Deer v. Okpik, 4 Canadian 
Native L. Rep. 93 (Cour Supérieure de Quebec 1980) (explaining that tribal judges “will look to the 
welfare of the child before the rights of a natural parent”).”). 
135 The Navajo Supreme Court opinions in the study’s three-year sample contained a total of 581 
citations to legal precedent. Of these citations, 486 were self-referential.  
136 Goldtooth v. Goldtooth, 3 Nav. R. 223 (W.R.Dist.Ct.1982). 
137 In re A.M.K., supra note 134. 
138 Id. at 200 (“The [lower Navajo] court further failed to consider the family law of Canada which 
closely tracks our own fundamental principles in its subordination of the right of parents to the best 
interest of the child and emphasis on extended family.”). 
139 Id. at 201. 
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foundations in traditional legal logic. In these cases, wide-ranging citations might 
actually help establish legitimacy.140 
According to the Navajo Supreme Court, not all external court citations are 
created equal. In particular, the Navajo Court emphasized Canadian law’s 
superiority relative to United States law for family law matters: “The emphasis on 
extended family in both Navajo and Canadian law diverges markedly from the 
traditional Anglo-American nuclear vision.”141 However, this preference does not 
appear to apply to all Navajo Supreme Court adjudication. In the sample, the 
Navajo Supreme Court’s citations relied far more heavily on United States 
precedent than Canadian (or other foreign) precedent. Its one citation to a 
Canadian court pales in comparison to its eighty-two citations to United States 
courts.  
The Navajo Supreme Court, and tribal courts generally, are not unique in 
their limited reliance on foreign courts. For instance, the United States Supreme 
Court is often characterized as having an “aversion” to citing foreign courts.142 
Although they may have company, tribal courts’ insular citation practices might be 
to their detriment. By overlooking external law, they may be “fail[ing] to make use 
of an important source of inspiration, one that enriches legal thinking, makes law 
more creative, and strengthens the democratic ties and foundations of different 
legal systems.”143 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, this study’s findings suggest that tribal courts have 
responded to their unenviable position at the intersection of two worlds by 
retreating to one. Essentially, they are islands in a jurisprudential archipelago. 
They rarely cited beyond tribal chambers—seventy percent of all citations were to 
tribal courts. And nearly all of these citations were self-referential, suggesting that 
each tribal court is secluded on its own island. Intertribal citation was almost non-
140 In the Navajo case under discussion, one party (the father) was a Canadian citizen. This fact 
likely accounts in part for the Navajo court’s deference to Canadian custom, although the opinion 
supports this citation by characterizing Canadian custom as similar to Navajo tradition. 
141 In re A.M.K., supra note 134, at 200. 
142 Adam Liptak, U.S. Court is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1; see, 
e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342-325 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
143Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of A Supreme Court in A Democracy, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 114 (2002). 
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existent, only surpassed in its infrequency by citation to foreign courts. In the 
limited circumstances when tribal courts did look beyond their own rulings, they 
tended to stick close to home. Their citation practices suggest a preference for 
decisions issued by courts in their own states, over United States courts further 
afield.  
These findings raise the question of whether tribal courts’ insularity is the 
result of circumstances that may to some extent be beyond their control, such as 
limited access to opinions. This study’s review of sources of tribal court opinions 
suggests that lack of access may indeed be a significant factor. The optimal 
source in terms of usability and comprehensiveness (WestlawNext) only contained 
opinions for a few dozen tribes, whereas 566 tribes are federally recognized and 
hundreds more are not.  
The article’s intertribal citation findings further support the theory that low 
citation rates are a function of poor access. The court responsible for the most 
instances of intertribal citation is a member of an intertribal court system. The 
judges that adjudicate for this tribe have extensive access to other member tribes’ 
opinions—indeed, they write them. All of this tribe’s intertribal citations were to 
tribes that also belong to the intertribal court system. In addition, according to a 
judge who sits on several tribal courts,144 most tribal judges prefer citing other 
tribes to United States courts. This preference is based on the fact that tribes 
share cultural practices and some disputes common to tribes do not frequent 
United States courts. The judge claimed that the main reason tribal court judges 
do not rely more heavily on other tribes’ opinions is lack of access. 
If access is indeed the primary cause of tribes’ low citation rates and tribes 
actually desire to cite more widely, then the pressing question becomes what can 
be done to help tribal courts escape their islands to become “a part of the main.”145 
Answering this question could have serious implications for tribes, and for the 
growing number of non-tribal parties who fall within their courts’ jurisdiction.146 
Crucially, the power to cite other courts extensively could help preserve tribal 
144 Interview with Judge BJ Jones, Chief Justice of the Turtle Mountain Tribal Court of Appeals, 
Special Magistrate of the Non-Removable Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Tribal Court, and alternate 
judge of the Three Affiliated Tribes Tribal Court (Mar. 8, 2013). 
145 JOHN DONNE, No Man is an Island, Meditation XVII, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 
(1624).  
146 E.g., Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong. § 904 (2013) 
(enacted) (creating special domestic violence jurisdiction). 
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courts’ severely limited resources.147, 148 Citations to prior decisions can replace 
time-consuming step-by-step legal analysis and can substitute for re-explanation 
of frequently adjudicated rules of law.  
Moreover, access to legal materials can shape the law itself. The ability to 
draw upon a broader supply of jurisprudence could help tribes respond to each 
dispute’s unique circumstances with more nuance, and could create a richer tribal 
common law. Tribal courts might also be able to lean more heavily on their own 
customary law and tradition if they could more easily look to other tribal courts that 
have done so for support. And each tribe’s body of customary law, in turn, could 
be strengthened over time through considered analysis and application. So 
ultimately, much is at stake in whether tribes resolve their current access 
limitations. With greater access, tribal courts could venture forth from their islands, 













147 See, e.g., Sophie Harnay & Alain Marciano, Judicial Conformity Versus Dissidence: An 
Economic Analysis of Judicial Precedent, 23 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 405, 408 (2003) (“A precedent 
thus serves to economize on the costs of decision-making.”). 
148 See, e.g., Douglas B.L. Endreson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts Today, 79 JUDICATURE 
142, 145 (1995) (“[T]hese systems have historically been underfunded.”). 
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ADDENDUM—FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this article will help bring greater visibility to the need for greater 
availability of tribal court opinions, its limited sample size and methodology leave 
room for additional, and more generalizable, analysis. For instance, an expanded 
timeframe (beyond this study’s three-year scope) would facilitate longitudinal 
assessment of citation practices. Changes over time could reveal the impact of 
changes in the accessibility of opinions. The strength of the sample could also be 
improved by increasing the number of tribal courts included therein. Moreover, 
including tribes that have not chosen to publish their opinions on WestlawNext 
would help eliminate any bias associated with the willingness or wherewithal to 
make opinions available.  
 Increasing the breadth of materials analyzed could help contextualize this 
study’s findings. A review of tribal legislation is particularly promising. At least one 
tribe has adopted a code that explicitly permits its tribal court to refer to other 
courts149 and another has enacted legislation requiring the application of state 
law.150 In addition, future research could review the portions of tribal constitutions 
creating tribal courts for directions as to how courts should treat external law. 
Some countries’ constitutions contain such provisions: “The openness of some 
legal systems to foreign law is reflected in their constitutions. The South African 
Constitution ... says that courts interpreting its bill of rights “must consider 
international law” and “may consider foreign law.””151  
 The methodology could also be expanded beyond numerical review. For 
instance, the treatment of cited opinions could be assessed along a negative to 
positive continuum. Understanding whether external law is primarily cited as 
authority or as inapplicable would help reveal how tribal courts view themselves 
within larger legal communities. A high rate of positive treatment for citations to 
other tribes’ opinions would support the view that there is in fact a “tribal common 
law.” High rates of negative treatment would not necessarily counter this theory. 
The fact that judges mention another tribe’s law at all suggests a commonality that 
149 Valencia-Weber, supra note 7, at 253 (according to the Sitka Tribe of Alaska Community 
Association Code and court rules, the Sitka Tribal Court “may refer to other sources of law for 
guidance, including the law of other tribes, federal, state or international.”).  
150 Cross, supra note 52, at 80 (“Pequot tribal legislation directs the tribal courts to apply 
Connecticut law in private civil actions.”). 
151 Liptak, supra note 142; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, Ch. 2, § 39. 
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invites cross-application. Arguably, the legal issues most frequently subject to 
positive treatment might form the core of any tribal common law. 
Finally, future research should focus on determining what drives or hinders 
citation in practice. A large-scale standardized interview of tribal judges is the most 
promising approach. Tribal judges likely have informed opinions about what tribal 
courts and communities might stand to gain or lose from increased external 
citation. If it seems likely that the result would be a net gain, then judges could also 
be consulted for practical suggestions about how the most serious barriers to 
citation might be overcome.  
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